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The Firm as Transaction Cost Economics Concept 
Plamen Tchipev 
Abstract: Within the framework of the mainstream neoclassical model, the existence of 
the firm creates serious theoretical difficulties. Major attempt to overcome them, leads to 
application of the Transaction cost economics developed by Coase, Williamson, etc. On its own 
turn, it creates new contradictions, part of which are treated by the present paper from the point 
of evolutionary political economy.  
Keywords: Economic theory, Transaction cost economics, Theory of the Firm, Coase, 
Williamson. 
INTRODUCTION - Problems with Defining the Firm in the Neoclassical Economics 
The “paradox of the firm” is well-known in economics – on one hand, the firm 
practically exists (and some!), on the other – the theory ignores it. The paradox appears from a 
certain theoretical trap due to the simultaneous action of two assumptions in the neoclassical 
theory. First is the generalizing assumption that the economy is a process of market 
optimization, which includes also respective allocation of factors of production. Ergo, only the 
economic agents, which follow this process, i.e. have a rational behaviour, have a reason to 
exist. 
Firms are such economic structures1 that obviously do not use this mechanism in their 
internal relations, which places them automatically outside the neoclassical theoretical scheme. 
In best case, as far as the neoclassical economics deals with them, it deprives them of an internal 
structure, which practically ignores them. 
Second assumption is about the way the mentioned concept is applied. The neoclassical 
economics requires alternative understanding of the optimizing action of the firm and the 
market.2 Ronald Coase interprets them as “what we find outside the firm is clearly alternative 
to what is in the firm” (Coase, 1937, p. 388). There is a choice option of “either-or” type. In 
the conditions of the undoubted supremacy of the market, postulated by the neoclassical 
economics, its alternative – the firm – cannot substitute it, i.e. it (really) is not its alternative! 
Thus, its analysis already completely remains outside the theoretical field of application of the 
neoclassical analysis. We will get back in more details to the consequences of the application 
of these two principles in section 2.2. Here, however, we have to mention that the predeceasing 
classical political economy offers the opportunity of analysis of the firm. 
Smith’s concept of manufacture and labour distribution is exactly such case (Smith, 
2016). The manufacture is the first production form, where the economic agent encompasses 
many persons, and has no legal regulation. The labour distribution is an intra-structural 
process in it, which makes it more competitive than the simple economic agents. This, in 
                                               
1 As mentioned, they are institutions, but we left the more neutral “structures” since the term is not 
axiomatically adopted in the standard neoclassical lexis. 
2 Coase calls the market - price mechanism, and Williamson identifies the firm and the market as hierarchy 
and market. 
essence, is a beginning of a serious firm analysis. However, strangely enough, the neoclassical 
paradigm ignores it, emphasizing rather controversially on the egoistic nature and greediness 
of the human (Palmer, 2011). Similar is the fate of the thesis of the “invisible hand”, which is 
separated of and opposed to the whole Smith’s moral and economic system, as well as many 
other categories. Smith is alienated from his categorical system and dogmatized. 
Of course, the reason for such “selective” reading of Smith lies in the deep disruption 
between the classical Smith’s analysis and the neoclassical economics. The latter proudly 
proclaims this disruption with the labour theory of value. The disruption is presented as a 
revolution, the Marginalist one, which has to break up with the base theory of Smith-Ricardo 
political economy.  
Things, however, are not so simple to the other categories of classical political economy. 
It turns out that some categories are quite valuable for the “revolutionised” political economy 
as well and should be kept. Above all is the liberal credo, which should be kept at all cost, and 
probably that is why, the new theory prefers to be called neoclassical, though much later. During 
this “deep revolution” other odd things happen as well. Besides undervaluing, missing or 
preferring to neglect many of the classical threads of the analysis, the new theory encroaches 
some of its own – let’s remember the fate of the “marginal utility”, the vanguard Austrian 
concept of alternative construction of value, which is later neglected by the neoclassical one. 
Same happens also with the theory of the firm, which becomes a victim of the disruption 
between the two paradigms. Exactly this “unseen” disruption with all methodological principles 
and postulates of the classics is a proof for the inability of the neoclassical economics to 
consider the firm an uncompetitive mechanism of the market to solve the problem. This can be 
done only through the evolutionary analysis. 
 
The Firm in the Transaction Costs Theory – Contributions 
Coase and the “Nature of the Firm” (1937) 
The critical view, which opens one of the heaviest questions in the micro analysis, is the 
one of Ronald Coase. He easily “sees” that the firm is not only left without attention but also 
without a reason. Coase postulates his ideas in the frames of the neoclassical paradigm and that 
is why he declares that he tries to “clarify assumptions on which a theory is based” (Coase, 
1937, p. 386). Moreover, Coase insists that they should be both “manageable” and “realistic”, 
since the micro analysis uses either “manageable” or “realistic” assumptions, which make its 
criticism and respectively its task much deeper, more essential than usually perceived! 
Thus, to him the firm is omitted in the “manageable” assumptions, i.e. those included in 
the model of distribution of the factors of production according to the price market mechanism. 
The few attempts to define are based on such set of assumptions, which aim to reflect more 
realistically the picture of the live economy, but are not bound to the “manageable” axioms.  
The solution, proposed by Coase, is based on the assumption that the market causes 
transaction costs (TC)3, which, roughly said, make the deals more expensive. That is why he 
defines the firm through the necessity to minimize the transaction costs. Since this assumption 
would lead to the presumption of the unlimited scale of the firms, transaction costs are 
subordinate also to the requirement to grow in parallel with the growth of the firm. Thus, the 
                                               
3 Coase calls them costs for “organization” or use of the price mechanism. Williamson is the one who 
codes the transaction costs as a term. 
 latter end the process by forming an optimal size of the firm. This is not a problem assumption, 
since it corresponds to the general idea of the behaviour of the costs in the neoclassical analysis. 
According to Coase, his solution should necessarily use both basic “Marshall” marginal 
analysis concepts – marginal analysis and substitution.4 It situates it inside the neoclassical 
paradigm. Coase wants to add missing link in these assumptions, in order to make the existence 
of the firm possible, and not to destroy the neoclassical paradigm! To some extent this explains 
why O. Williamson, though considered a neo-institutionalist, actually applies neoclassical 
approaches. 
Oliver Williamson and Transaction Cost Economics 
O. Williamson builds an entire theory from the assumptions of Coase. With the 
Transaction Costs Economics (TCE) Williamson reconfirms the theoretical existence of the 
firm, making contributions, with which actually he just further enriches the nomenclature of 
these costs and formalizes their analysis. He assumes that: 
 Many people have opportunistic behaviour, which, together with the transaction-
specific investments in human and physical capital, creaetes a vertical integration (i.e. 
growth of the firm). 
 Though it is necessary, information is rarely effectively processed. 
 Assessment of Transaction Costs Economics is a problem of a comparative institutional 
analysis. 
Moreover, Williamson introduces also new reasons – if the transactions are non-specific, 
then the market can minimize the transaction costs directly, without a firm. Random and non-
standard transactions would profit from some integration between the agents (Williamson, 
1973). 
Concerning the firm5, it becomes completely economically justified, with repeating 
transactions, which include specific investment at high uncertainty. Thus, a situation arises, 
when the firm is not indifferent to the transactions it makes! The firm can have justified 
existence with one type of transactions and unjustified – with another activity. It means that it 
can emerge independently from the requirement of effectiveness. It just turns on and off certain 
transactions from its activity, unrelated to the optimization mechanism. 
Williamson interprets this as an addition to the effective functioning of the market, but 
actually this denies the very idea of market optimization, since if we have many efficiencies 
(and corresponding structures in the economic space) in reality we deny the neoclassical 
paradigm about the market as an ultimate optimizing procedure. This means that the 
optimization (if one continues at all to observe such economic behaviour) will happen between 
better and more effectively organized hierarchies. This replaces the very nature of the market 
economies.  
The opposite assumption – that optimization of economic agents of both market and 
hierarchy type is possible – would mean creation of a principle advantage for one side in the 
optimization process, where all resources will be collected in one agent and the system would 
block (Jensen, and Meckling, 1976).  
                                               
4 The margin and the substitution – “the substitution at the margin” (Coase, 1937, p. 386). 
5 Determined by him as transaction-specific governance structure (Williamson, (1979). 
Though with different logics, the criticism of Stanley Fischer is very close exactly on 
this point: “most of all it could be rationalized through adopting suitably specified transaction 
costs” (Fischer, 1977). 
 Institutional Criticism 
Besides the main weakness, which we mentioned as “paradox of the firm” regarding the 
two assumptions in the neoclassical theory – market optimization and alternative treatment of 
the firm to the market, there is also a neglecting of the intra-structural analysis of the firm. It is 
not possible for the economic agent to have structure, internal organization, respective 
separation of the functions, of ownership from control, and eventually to be an object of 
corporate governance. 
Evolutionary political economy would assume (if optimization really acts in the way 
predicted by the mainstream theory) that exactly the market could generate the firms. That they 
are just a juridical form (continuation) of the economic agent, represented by the physical 
person! Why at all the hierarchies (firms) are considered antipodes of the markets? The answer 
to these questions is a subject of another discussion, but the breaking up with the classics creates 
the principle inability for neoclassical economists to consider the firm a non-competitive 
mechanism of the market, which would solve the problem. 
Another reason is that the internal structure cannot be modelled as a result of the 
market mechanism. We have to note that the micro analysis postulates a competitive, oligopoly 
or monopoly structure, and then models different market answers, but does not produce different 
structures from the functioning of the price mechanism. This is impossible and that is why the 
used methodology is the second serious obstacle to the real analysis of the firm. 
Formalizing some more or less reliable structures, Williamson, and later the whole 
school of his followers, opens an endless field for speculative analysis on which structure is 
“more effective” or not, what will happen if we change a small premise, etc. In reality the 
dynamics of the structures is as big as the dynamics of the price mechanism, and respectively 
the attempts to “reduce” it are also pointless. Thus, the method opposes the postulates that 
created it. 
There is one more very serious contradiction to the transaction costs concept concerning 
the functioning of the market mechanism. Adopting these costs, as the work of the neo-
institutional school shows, is an endless process of finding newer and newer ones. This means 
that there can always be a more specific one, and its introduction to a concrete market model 
could rearrange the whole model. This methodological loop clearly shows the presence of a 
contradictory assumption somewhere in the very subject. In our opinion, this contradiction is in 
the very nature of the transaction costs. 
 
Contradictions of the Transaction Costs Concept 
The assumption of the transaction costs is based on an internal contradiction with 
another founding principle of the economic system, which is an object of analysis here. First, 
let’s look in detail at the nature of the concept. 
 
The Nature of the Transaction Costs 
Coase bases his concept on quite clear logics, unfortunately, however, too simplified. 
There are costs due to the necessity to find the “relevant prices”. There are also costs for the 
very “contract”. This means that he assumes an additional element to the normal production 
 costs (the latter include also a component for marketing, image presentation, etc.). This 
component emerges from the very action of the market, the “exchange mechanism”, as Coase 
calls it. This suggests that these are over-costs, imposed and adopted only because of the 
exchange process. Coase even analyses this case in a footnote (Coase, 1937, p. 394), where he 
mentions that turning the economy into one big firm is conceivable. If we give up on the 
“consumer choice”, we can completely eliminate the market costs. 
We put aside that it is a direct opening of the door to arguments on the nature of the 
central planning, which even then is object of heavy debate. More importantly, Coase himself 
has no doubts that the transaction costs are not production costs but costs caused in the 
exchange phase, and that they can be optimized and realized in a normal (or if you prefer 
capitalist) economy. 
We will leave for a moment this debate and will remind one of the biggest merits of the 
classical economics. 
The Exchange in the Classical Economics 
There are some important lines, where the classical economics breaks up with 
mercantilism. One of them is the relation between the creation of value and the exchange. 
According to this assumption, the exchange cannot create value. There are many producers; 
respectively they create goods with certain level of value according to some socially permissible 
logics in one way or another (the opportunities for Smith are several!). This logics excludes the 
possibility for creation of even a minimum value in the exchange process, since it would make 
the closing of the processes and their distinguishing from one another impossible. 
If, despite all, the theoretical model allows creation of value in the exchange act, i.e. 
non-equivalent exchange, then some very heavy problems of backward loop appear.  
- On one hand, there is no reason for the exchange acts to stop because of the 
possibility of making the goods more expensive due to their continuous circulation. 
This would lead to liquidation of the consumption, i.e. the product will not be 
consumed. We are not far from the monetary fetishism – the treasure in the hands of 
the Moliere’s miser Harpagon who only counts his coins without using them.  
- On the other hand, soon the production costs share will become too small in the total 
volume of trade costs and the production phase of the economic process will also 
become pointless. 
Such assumption is not just an abstract construction but suggests two quite specific cases 
of real economies for its realization. 
The first real possibility for it to work is in a very early and primitive phase of market 
(capitalistic) economy, where the market sector is literary “sunk” in non-market ways of 
production (feudal or family-common) and whose agents function as net donors for the market 
system. Roughly, this is the whole period of the pre-manufacture economy, when traders, 
actively functioning on market principle, buy goods from different “suppliers”, who for many 
reasons cannot reach the market and get their evaluation. The whole British economy in the 
colonies has functioned on this principle, selling to the villagers via market the cheap textile 
produced from the cotton bought from the same villagers. This is the infinite power of such 
model, drawing from the uneven position of the participating agents. And this is also its absolute 
weakness – the moment the genius of Mahatma Gandhi finds a simple way to counteract it by 
encouraging his fellow-citizens non-cooperation, i.e. to not buy British goods but to 
manufacture them themselves - the model stops functioning, leading eventually to 
independence of India.6 
Second possibility for existence of economy, which derives (or adds, as is the modern 
term) value in the exchange process, is if it is realized in non-equivalent foreign trade. Actually, 
it is the base of the economic model of mercantilism. It can and really has certain explanatory 
function, but only as far as it includes economic agents external to the system. This model, 
however, is also practically dying out, since the globalization of the world economy makes the 
non-equivalent trade, in the traditional sense of the term, harder. And yes, of course, at the end 
the second case of non-equivalent exchange is also reduced to the previous one, because it 
suggests that one agent in the exchange relation is traditional, or non-capital oriented in the 
mentioned sense. 
As a whole, the classical economic paradigm solves the mentioned problem by 
postulating that the economic activity is derived into phases – production, exchange and 
consumption.7 In the first phase goods are created (and value, since the classical model is based 
on the labour theory of the value). In the second phase the goods are exchanged, and in the third 
phase they are destroyed (consumed). A circle, circular model of the economy is formed. And 
with two sectors and a market, which binds them. It is the famous two-sector8 economy model, 
conveniently placed in every textbook on microeconomics, suggesting that it is an achievement 
of the neoclassics. Actually, it is defined by the postulates formulated by the classical political 
economy. 
If we go back to the opposite assumption that value is created also in the second phase, 
we see that it turns the model into a non-structured mass of economic acts, deprives it of cyclic 
recurrence and gives it a random and chaotic character. 
Neoclassical Model and the Equivalent Exchange 
The fact that the new (marginal) doctrine keeps this point, though it broke most of the 
elements of the replaced classical paradigm, shows the strength and significance of the postulate 
of the equivalence and neutrality of the exchange. However, in the neoclassic theory, this 
assumption is difficult to be found out because of the implicit way of defining the fundaments 
of this theory. That is why Weintraub determines it as “meta-theory”. “The neoclassical 
economy is meta-theory. I.e. a bouquet of unclear rules or assumptions for creating satisfactory 
economic theories. It is a research program, which generates economic theories. Its fundamental 
axioms are not open for discussion and thus they determine the shared views of those who call 
themselves neoclassical or just economists without any adjectives” (Weintraub, 1993). 
                                               
6 The space here does not allow us to go into details, but the non-market “sunkness” 
suggests promising directions for analysis, raising interesting questions like is market economy 
functioning in pure form possible without the simultaneous presence of pre-market (non-
market) forms such as the different feudal, traditional and other productions, which are more or 
less non-capital oriented, i.e. they are more “oeconomicus” than “chrematistics”, if we use 
Aristotle’s distinction. 
7 The radical political economy adds the distribution as well, but in the liberal economy 
it is given in the logics of the first two stages, and in my opinion its differentiation is not 
necessary. 
8 The third sector – the state – comes much later, and not always. 
 Still, the careful consideration of the nature of the neoclassical model gives enough 
reasons to state that it also keeps the requirement for the exchange acts (mostly barter) to not 
increase the value or utility of the exchanged goods. 
Most of all, the mentioned circular model, on which this economics builds its logics, 
reveals this principle. 
To the same conclusion leads the (barter) defining of the exchange in the neoclassical 
economics – equivalent process, which really starts with different evaluations of the two 
involved agents for the utility of “own” respectively “others’” exchanged good. The process 
continues till the two contractors equalize the marginal utility they derive from the exchange 
act. Then, the exchange is complete, the exchanged relation is objectified in a price, and the two 
agents are in their optimal state of maximum satisfaction. The neoclassical economics not only 
requires this but also proclaims it as a sublime goal and most significant achievement of the 
economy, namely the optimal (optimised) satisfaction of the needs of maximum economic 
agents. 
In the exchange of goods for money the logical chain is complicated from the assumption 
that the money has no decreasing marginal utility (Austrian school). Generally, however, the 
process has no difference, since the Austrians simultaneously assume that the money reflects 
the marginal utility of previous (other) transactions. 
The other big debate concerning the application of money (whether it is neutral or not 
to the market) also deserves attention. In our opinion, it has no relation to the discussed problem, 
since it concerns the question whether the relative prices of goods change or not with a change 
in the money supply, but it does not doubt the logics of each exchange act. 
The additional argument, that the neoclassical model in its principles also includes the 
neutrality of the exchange, is in the analysis of the situation – exchange of labour for utility of 
goods or money. In this case, the pure microeconomic tracing of the process shows that the 
marginal utility of the refusal of freedom and control over time, which the workers do, equalize 
to the marginal utility of the goods received in the exchange (or purchasing power). 
Moreover, it is added with the macroeconomic requirement of inviolability of the 
general contribution of each factor of production to the social product. The neoclassical 
economics breaks up with the logics of Ricardo and Marx that in the production process there 
is a redistribution of income and product between the owners of the different factors (from the 
labour to the capital) and insists that each factor receives exactly as much as its contributes to 
the manufactured product, which on the other hand is determined by its marginal productivity. 
Thus, the assumption that in the exchange of labour for money the principle of 
equivalent is violated would renew in another form the problem, of which the neoclassical 
economics tries to set free. This argument has rather auxiliary significance, but also underlines 
the neutral character of the exchange, which in fact is the goal of this diversion in the history of 
the economic theories. 
Transaction Costs and the Principle of Neutrality of the Exchange 
If we return to the problem of the transaction costs, we will see some interesting facts. 
Most of all, there is no doubt that their adoption violates the principle of neutrality of the 
exchange phase concerning the total product. Roughly, adding the market-derived costs, the 
logics of Coase, Williamson and others actually adds value, or if we keep to the subjective 
terms – utility to the created product. And on a completely standard principle, like any other 
cost. Hence, the agent (in this case the firm since it is the target of Coase) can form also profit, 
etc. 
Now, having in mind that (1) the neo-institutional analysis literary swarms with different 
types of such costs, and (2) they have claims to approximate the model to the reality, and (3) 
these costs are made to reveal the whole information necessary for the deal, including all 
possible consequences from one or other outcome on the contract, with the uncertainty, etc., it 
becomes clear that this assumption is not just contradictory. It undermines the very logics of 
the market mechanism. The market starts to function as one of the sides in the deal, it becomes 
an economic agent! And: 
 It is clear in advance which side; 
 Can change the side during the deal; 
 Can even influence both sides simultaneously. 
No wonder that the “features” of the concept have deserved the opinion that 
“(t)ransaction costs have well-deserved bad reputation as a theoretical instrument…” (Fischer, 
1977). 
This concept contradicts also to other initial premises for the market, like immediate 
action, free and equal access of all agents to information, etc. Each of them deserves own 
attention and interest. Unfortunately, the space in the current paper does not allow us to go into 
details. 
As mentioned, it has the characteristics to be true only in the case of merger of the whole 
economy into one firm. It has extremely unsuitable side, besides the ideological implications, 
to lead to denial of the market in general, like mechanism for organizing the economy, which 
is the least contradiction to the practice. 
Concluding remarks 
The analysis here is rather limited - to examine whether the assumption of presence of 
transaction costs can solve the problem of the lack of logical determination for existence of the 
firm in the frames of the neoclassical paradigm. 
Constructed as an optimization game between manufactures and consumers, the 
neoclassical mechanism practically expands its activity only between the different firms, 
implicitly reducing them to points, to simple variables in mathematical sense, or to black boxes 
in the systems theory. 
The base of this paradigm error is, of course, the mechanical approach, which is 
dominant in the marginal revolution (and unfortunately till now!). It “atomizes” the economic 
subjects, on the example of the Newton physics, for which the objects are just “bodies”, which 
move evenly, rectilinear and infinite (if some other power does not influence them), but for 
which we do not know (and do not care of) nothing more. Thus, the possibility for analysis of 
their internal structures not only disappears but there is also contradiction between firms and 
markets, which drags the necessity of Transaction Costs Economics. 
The most interesting is that the criticism against the “atomization” is not at all new for 
the neoclassical economics. It practically accompanies its whole history – the problems with 
the firm are only another consequence of this methodological defect. 
When the question of the nature, structure and functioning of the economic agent, its 
development, etc., arises, it becomes clear that they cannot be considered outside the principles, 
on which certain scientific paradigm is created. And that these concrete principles do not allow 
denial of the application of the transaction costs concept.  
 For our task it means that transaction costs theory cannot explain the question of the 
existence of the firm. The problem of whether and why the firm is more effective on the market 
is the next misinterpretation in the neoclassical economic theory. 
As mentioned, the answer is somewhere else – in the institutional nature of the firm. 
When it is not just “addressed” but really studied, it will become clear that it is not alternatively 
opposed to the market but its product and continuation. This will open the way for searching 
for the answer to the question why it exists. This gives opportunity for further analysis of the 
firm. 
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